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http://www.springerplus.com/content/3/1/556RESEARCH Open AccessTowards institutionalised regionalism: the role of
institutions and prospects for institutionalisation
in ASEAN
Pattharapong RattanaseveeAbstract
This paper provides concrete understanding of the role of institutions and prospects for institutionalisation in
ASEAN. It highlights the significant roles of institutions in the integrating Southeast Asia and demonstrates three
main areas of institutional deficiency in the association. However, although ASEAN institutions meet the
expectations, by and large, in terms of serving the national governments and upholding the association’s norms,
along with theoretical explanation, this paper argues that ASEAN should focus on strengthening its existing
institutional structure by providing them with a mandate and sufficient financial and human resources in order to
support its administration and growing activities. Finally, the paper suggests a revision of the current financial
contribution system, a seeking of alternative sources of income and some institutional inventions such as a research
wing and a mechanism that can get non-state actors involved in the process.
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Despite regional integration having been introduced in
Europe since 1950s, in Southeast Asia it was not until
the 1980s that it began to gain attention. The 1997 fi-
nancial crisis highlighted the high degree of interdepend-
ence among ASEAN members and the urgent need for
closer cooperation towards more intensive regional com-
munity building. To fulfil this ambition and match the
speed of European integration, institutional development
is widely thought to be one of the most important driv-
ing factors. In fact, ASEAN has undergone significant
transformation over recent decades by revamping its in-
stitutional structure in ways that can now support its ad-
ministration and activities in such a way as to be able to
invite comparisons with the European Union (Jetschke
and Murray 2011: 176). Such efforts can be found for
example in the ASEAN Vision 2020 introduced in 1997,
the 2003 Bali Summit and the 2004 Vientiane Action
Programme. More recently, the ASEAN Charter adopted
in 2008 appears to be the most important agreement
aimed at strengthening its institutional organs. That is,Correspondence: p.rattanasevee@yahoo.com
Department of Social and Policy Sciences, University of Bath, Claverton
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in any medium, provided the original work is pthe Charter has improved the organisation’s implemen-
tation and dispute-settlement mechanisms, consolidated
its decision-making structure and provided the associ-
ation with more rule-based conditions as well as more
legally binding obligations. Nevertheless, its weak insti-
tutional structure and a significant gap between its rhet-
orical goals of cooperation and its actual achievements
have always been a mainstream criticism of ASEAN and
demonstrate an area of great deficiency. This problem
greatly limits ASEAN’s capacity to enhance an integra-
tion process and adopt a genuinely regional approach to
tackle transnational problems. Although ASEAN leaders
realize this weakness and continue to strengthen the in-
stitutional mechanisms, it is understood that those com-
mitments are clearly insufficient and ineffective due to
being constrained by the principles of ASEAN Way and
other important factors that continue to limit the role of
ASEAN institutions.
To reiterate the role of institutions, new institutionalism
claims that strong institutions are a prerequisite for con-
structing a regional community, for they act as the rules of
the game and they link all actors and their action together.
Similarly, integration theories also highlight the importance
of institutions in the process. Under neofunctionalism,an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
g/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction
roperly credited.
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where all political activities take place, while liberal inter-
governmentalism underlines their role in facilitating and
accelerating the integration process to achieve mutually
desired outcomes, for example, by providing reliable infor-
mation, monitoring compliance and linking across issues.
However, in the context of ASEAN where the member
states are highly influenced by the normative underpin-
nings of the ASEAN Way, a better understanding can be
gained from constructivism as it appears to be a more
comprehensive framework to explain international behav-
ior and highlight the relationships between rules, norms,
institutions and identities. Under the constructivist lens,
regional integration is depicted as a social interaction,
which includes international contexts by considering states
and institutions as cognitive and correlative entities. This
supports the perspective that international contexts are
vital for understanding institutions in the regional settings
as they construct states’ identities and interests. In sum,
these theories identify the key roles of institution and hold
that to construct a successful regional community a certain
form of institutional arrangements is required.
In terms of institution, the case of ASEAN could make
an insightful contribution to the study of regional integra-
tion. It contrasts the picture of European integration in that
so far it has mainly bypassed the role of the institution, con-
centrating more on the influence of national governments
in the process. Consequently, examining the institution in
the context of ASEAN and its impact on integration would
shed new light on regional contexts in the developing world
that do not have a tradition of strong institutions. In this
paper, I will begin with providing a concise background of
institutional development in ASEAN and the current insti-
tutional structure of the association after being enhanced in
2007 by the ASEAN Charter. Then, I move on to discuss
concepts about institutions from the viewpoint of con-
structivism, as a main theoretical approach in this study.
The following section provides empirical evidence for
evaluating the role of institutions in the development of
ASEAN’s integration. The final section concludes this study
by providing further discussion and a summary of the im-
portant findings as well as giving constructive suggestions
for solutions to the problems identified. This paper uses
documents and interviews with technocrats and scholars as
the main research methods. This research is undertaken in
accordance with the University of Bath Ethical Guidelines
and Code of Good Practice in Research.
Background
From the outset, the development of ASEAN institu-
tions was highly influenced by a set of ideas that were
shaped by the regional cultural values and events that
‘preoccupied politicians, intellectuals and opinion leaders
over many years’ (Stubbs 2008: 455). Regarding this, thehistory, ideas and the distinctive traits of ASEAN Way
have served to define an appropriate means of diplomacy
and multilateralism, which could provide an explanation
for the nature of institutionalisation within the region.
In relation to history, it can be traced back to the timing
of the formation of ASEAN in 1967. The end of confron-
tation between Indonesia and Malaysia, the rise of nation-
alism resulting from colonial experiences, the gaining of
independence by ASEAN members, the spread of com-
munism and the Cold War that took a strong hold on the
region were the key drivers that helped to ‘shape the idea-
tional basis of the association and its initial trajectory’
(Stubbs 2008: 456). Similarly, Narine (1998: 33) pointed
out that there were interrelated objectives involved in the
creation of ASEAN: ‘to alleviate intra-ASEAN tensions, to
reduce the regional influence of external actors and to
promote the socioeconomic development of its member
states as a further hedge against Communist insurgency’.
These concerns continued to influence the association
until the end of 1970s, when the member states started to
prosper, mainly from increasing foreign direct investment,
and gain more confidence, which resulted in several treat-
ies and declarations as well as institutional initiatives. To
some extent, this affirms the belief that the initial decision
and intention to establish ASEAN were productive and
hence had paid off.
ASEAN is well-known for its informality, personalism
as well as reluctance and discomfort towards the adop-
tion of solid formal institutions and legally binding obli-
gations. The internal dynamics of ASEAN institutions
has been designed based on the principal values of the
organisation. Accordingly, the avoidance of armed con-
flict, the non-interference in the internal affairs of other
states, the consensus-based decision making and the
non-legally binding agreements give plenty of space for
member states to exercise their rights and powers freely
as well as to pursue their regional agendas. To some ex-
tent, this helps to create a scene of equality in that the
smaller member states feel comfortable when dealing
with larger partners. The ASEAN’s norms are a strong
commitment to the idea of state sovereignty which was
‘the most important protection against the internal and
external weaknesses of the ASEAN states’ (Busse 1999: 46).
Collins (2007: 212) posited that ‘ASEAN was therefore
established to ensure sovereignty remained firmly located
at the national level’ and clearly not intended to be a supra-
national institution, equivalent to the European Union.
However, as a consequence of its members unwillingness
to delegate powers to the institutional bodies, ASEAN
lacks effective institutional mechanisms to support, pursue
and deliver its objectives and policy initiatives as well as be-
ing unable to act against the will of a member state. With
the absence of a strong central authority, policy delivery
and forceful compliance mechanisms, ‘ASEAN continues to
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their perceived national interests, and peer pressure to en-
sure compliance with its agreements and decisions’ (Asian
Development Bank 2010: 125). This situation has resulted
in a poor record of implementation and a number of well-
voiced criticisms. For instance, ASEAN is often referred to
as “a talk shop”, “a toothless tiger” or “big on words but
small on action”.
ASEAN’s institutional structure after the implementation
of the ASEAN Charter
In terms of institutionalisation, the most significant step
forward was taken in 2007. The ASEAN Charter serves
to provide legally binding and institutional framework
for accomplishing the ASEAN community. It sets out
rules, norms, values, budget and finance, administrative
procedures as well as the structure of institutional bod-
ies. As can be seen in Figure 1, the institutional structure
of ASEAN is relatively complex and has wide horizontal
configuration. As described in the ASEAN Charter,1 the
organisation has nine main institutional bodies as fol-
lows. The ASEAN Summit is the supreme institutional
organ of ASEAN, taking the form of an annual meeting
comprising the heads of member states and dialogue
partners and is responsible for ‘taking decisions on key
issues pertaining to the realisation of the objectives of
ASEAN, important matters of interest to member states.’
The ASEAN Coordinating Council (ACC) attended by
the foreign ministers of the member states who meet at
least twice a year, is responsible for preparing the sum-
mit and coordinating ‘the implementation of agreements
and decisions of the ASEAN Summit’ and with the
ASEAN Community Councils is tasked with enhancing
policy coherence, efficiency and cooperation across these
institutions. The ASEAN Community Councils together
comprise the Three Pillars of ASEAN Community CouncilsFigure 1 ASEAN’s institutional organs after the ASEAN Charter.the: ASEAN Political-Security Community Council,
ASEAN Economic Community Council, and the ASEAN
Socio-Cultural Community Council. The objectives of
each pillar are to coordinate the work of the relevant sec-
tors, ensure the implementation of the relevant decisions
as well as to submit reports and recommendations to the
summit. The ASEAN Sectoral Ministerial Bodies are in
charge of implementing the agreements and decisions of
the ASEAN Summit, strengthening cooperation in the
field and submitting reports and recommendations to
their respective Community Councils.
The Secretary General of ASEAN and the ASEAN
Secretariat form the organisation’s central administra-
tive body. These staff work only for ASEAN and should
not seek or receive instructions from any government or
external party. The Secretary General is appointed by
the ASEAN Summit for a non-renewable term of five-
years and is assisted by four Deputy Secretaries-General
who come from four different ASEAN member states. The
Committee of Permanent Representatives to ASEAN
(CPR) is a new important body, formerly known as the
Standing Committee, which consist Permanent Represen-
tatives to ASEAN who act as its ambassadors. They ‘sup-
port the work of the ASEAN Community Councils and
ASEAN Sectoral Ministerial Bodies’ as well as being tasked
to ‘liaise with the Secretary-General of ASEAN and the
ASEAN Secretariat on all subjects relevant to its work and
facilitate ASEAN cooperation with external partners.’ The
ASEAN National Secretariats serve as ‘the national focal
points, being the repository of information on all ASEAN
matters at the national level, coordinating the implementa-
tion of ASEAN decisions at the national level.’ The ASEAN
Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights
(AICHR), created to fulfil the objectives of promoting and
protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms, oper-
ates ‘in accordance with the terms of reference to be
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nally, the ASEAN Foundation was established to ‘promot-
ing greater awareness of the ASEAN identity, people-
to-people interaction, and close collaboration among the
business sector, civil society, academia and other stake-
holders in ASEAN.’ That is, it supports the Secretary-
General of ASEAN and cooperates with the relevant insti-
tutions to promote ASEAN community building. Moreover,
the Charter has paved the way for ASEAN to engage with
other entities that support its purposes and principles,
which can include organisations in the areas of: business,
academia, civil society and science and technology.
Overall, the introduction of the ASEAN Charter was a
significant progress, which was aimed at promoting in-
stitutional development and silencing growing criticism
by providing ASEAN with more rules-based and legally
binding foundations, Moreover, it had the goal of the
creation of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) as
a single market and production base by 2015. It has been
attested that the Charter ‘improves the organization’s com-
pliance mechanisms, streamlines its decision-making struc-
ture, and extends its dispute-settlement mechanism’ (Asian
Development Bank 2010: 124). The ASEAN Secretariat
and the Secretary General can be construed as the core ad-
ministrative mechanism of ASEAN’s institutions and is
provided with its own financial resources and professional
staff. However, the Charter did not change the Associa-
tion’s adherence to the principle of non-intervention into
domestic affairs, the dominant emphasis on national inter-
ests and the manner of elitism (Jetschke 2009:418). As a
lone central authority and the centre of institutional dy-
namics, the ASEAN Secretariat, though having many im-
portant responsibilities, still has very limited power. Before
the restructuring of ASEAN institutions in 1992, it served
as a channel of information and was never meant to be an
important body that would be able to command ASEAN
activities and set agendas. Despite it having been accorded
ministerial status and assigned to monitor and implement
ASEAN policies after the Fourth ASEAN Summit in 1992,
the Secretariat still has little input on policy initiatives, only
operating in accordance with the directives issued by the
ASEAN leaders and foreign ministers (Hernandez 2007:
11). Even with the recent improvements in mandate and
monitoring compliance given by the Charter, ASEAN is
still a very top-down organisation, with the Secretariat still
having to face many difficulties, as although they have to
implement the policy of its leaders, they lack the resources,
in terms of funding and qualified staff, to perform their
function. Regarding this, Suryodiningrat (2009) has argued
that ‘in practice, the secretary-general remains an official
prostrate to the member countries’. Thus, it is apparent
that ASEAN institutions would continue to have limited
power for effectively policy implementation as long as
there has not been a significant shift in the vision of theorganisation’s leaders. In particular, the principles of sover-
eignty and non-interference, which have been rigidly up-
held by its member states, need to be revisited.2
Constructivism and ASEAN institutions
Although new institutionalism precisely provides the
means to think theoretically about institutions as well as
their roles and their influences on behaviour and out-
comes, it does not exemplify the dynamics or interactions
with other important elements in the process. Further-
more, it does not give a clue about how to set up or design
an appropriate arrangement of institutions based on the
context of regional settings. On the other hand, construct-
ivism takes a sociological concept of action to extend the
scope of theoretical explanation by focusing on the im-
portance of institutions to state action in relation to
norms and by bringing the international context into the
discussion. It argues that human action and behaviour are
driven by norms, rules, institutions and identities. Under
this lens, rules and institutions are seen as products made
by human practices and states as well as institutions are
viewed as cognitive and correlative entities. Moreover, the
outcomes are shaped by the current institutions and also
by actors’ learning through the previous ones. More im-
portantly, according to Narine (1998), almost all inter-
national relationships that shape states’ identities and
interests are developed within an institutional context and
institutions themselves act as representatives of the rules
and norms of these international interactions. In other
words, with this perspective institutions are tasked with
securing and maintaining the norms as well as the con-
structed identities. Moreover, institutions in the construc-
tivist’s view are not rigid as argued by new institutionalist
scholars. Accordingly, they, including interests and iden-
tities, can be altered by the integration process at the sys-
tematic level through various kinds of interactions
(Wendt 1992, Wendt 1995). This introduces the idea that
the surrounding environments, external constraints and
international contexts are vital for understanding institu-
tions in the regional settings. Thus, according to Cini
(2007: 131), institutions are ‘arenas for communication,
deliberation, argumentation, persuasion and socialization’
among actors.
In the context of European integration, the role of insti-
tutions has clearly accorded with most of the theoretical
explanations in that they are at the heart of the integration
process. That is, they play a key role in initiating and set-
ting the agenda, law-making, budgeting, coordinating,
implementing policies as well as monitoring procedures.
They are the backbone of the union and a place where
member states pool some of their sovereignty, resources
and confidence. All these functions are legally under-
pinned as prescribed in the EU Treaties and ratified not
only at the central level but also by members’ parliaments,
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tions to perform EU’s activities. However, although EU in-
stitutions are solid, powerful and seen as a principal
feature of European integration, to a certain extent, na-
tional governments still play a pivotal role in determining
what policy is made. In sum, the evidence regarding the
EU concurs with the view that the institutional configur-
ation required in a regional integration project is deter-
mined by the ‘historical circumstances of the group of
countries’ (Best 2005: 43).
Unlike integration theories and new institutionalism,
constructivism is capable to explain the role of norms
and collective identity in the context of ASEAN integra-
tion. As the ASEAN Way evidently plays a vital part in
the dynamics of ASEAN integration, hence constructiv-
ism can deliberately explain the formation of collective
identity at regional level and could potentially be one in-
fluential approach to analyse subjective issues or things
relating to the ideational force within integrating re-
gions. Acharya (2005: 95) asserted that constructivism
offers ‘a more complete explanation of ASEAN’s achieve-
ments and failures’ in which international action and
institutional-building are seen as ‘shapers of the regional
balance of power’. Similarly, Busse (1999: 39–41) viewed
that we can gain a better understanding from constructiv-
ism because ASEAN members, to some extent, have
moved away from pure balance-of-power politics towards
establishing a regional code of conduct which rotates
around norms. He concluded that such adherence to
norms has become an essential part of their foreign policy
and must be seen as a basis of their national interests. On
the whole, due to the low degree of institutionalisation,
the non-legalistic approach to cooperation and limited re-
source capacity, I am of the view that, for ASEAN, the
normative underpinnings and ideational force have more
play in solidifying and maintaining the association. Thus,
viewing ASEAN through the lens of constructivism is
indispensable and no serious study of ASEAN could be
completed without careful consideration of the role of
norms.
Re-emphasising the problems of institutional deficiency:
an empirical investigation
In the context of ASEAN, its institutions have always been
at the centre of criticism about the association. Moreover,
according to the collected research data, institutions have
been a problematic area and given their importance as
purported regional integration theory, clearly require at-
tention. Repeatedly, ASEAN leaders and many observers
have accepted that the problem of institutions is a major
weakness which has resulted in a number of attempts in
strengthening the ASEAN Secretariat and other institu-
tional bodies recently, most explicitly seen in the ASEAN
Charter. However, it is argued that those efforts have beeninsufficient to make them a reality owing to several obsta-
cles that continue to limit the role of its institutions. First
of all, any study of ASEAN institutions would uncover
that ASEAN fundamentally has to work within the con-
text of intergovernmentalism, whereby the organisation
prefers non-intrusive decision-making and has no intention
of following a path of supranationalism. That is, it has been
‘deliberately designed for flexibility to allow national gov-
ernments sufficient autonomy in deciding which sectors
to liberalise deregulate or reform and at what speed’
(Nesadurai 2012: 4). Apparently, perhaps as reflected by
its name, the ASEAN Secretariat is never far away from
being a glorified secretary who works in an office sorting
out the daily paper work, making phone calls and arran-
ging meetings for the organisation, and never given the
power to make important decisions and initiate policy.
This perspective was backed by an Indonesian scholar
from CSIS who depicted the ASEAN Secretariat as:
“The ASEAN Secretariat is exactly like the name. It is
a secretariat. It is for administrative issues only…
documents, letters. It is not a decision-making body.”3
The first matter that I will address is regarding the role of
the ASEAN Secretariat and its performance. As discussed
previously, the ASEAN Secretariat and the Secretary Gen-
eral of ASEAN, although having been enhanced by the
Charter, still have a very limited role in policy-making and
are not capable of acting against obstinate members. There
is quite a significant number of evidence supporting this
view. For example, Hund (2002: 118) contended that ‘the
ASEAN Secretariat remains at the margins of ASEAN
policy-making’ as it does not possess delegated powers for
commanding individual member state compliance or
devising common policies on its own initiative. Simi-
larly, according to Capannelli and Tan (2012: 14), the
ASEAN Secretariat’s remit has principally been to ‘fur-
nish administrative support rather than been invested
with powers of delegation… and did not aim to create
regional bureaucracies promoting a more independent
agenda for integration beyond the scope provided by
intergovernmental cooperation structures’. In addition,
a recent review conducted by Desker (2008) found that
during the preceding forty years only 30% of ASEAN
agreements and initiatives were actually implemented,
which points to the incapacity of the ASEAN Secretariat
and he concluded that it does need to be strengthened.
Nevertheless, as advised by constructivism, I personally be-
lieve that ASEAN leaders, whose action and decision are
considerably constrained by the norms, still wish to main-
tain the national autonomy, its policy initiation and su-
preme decision making. Therefore, in order to coordinate
ASEAN activities and avoid conflicts of national interests, I
am convinced that expansion in the size and strengthening
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ASEAN Secretariat are required. This would help improve
the association’s efficiency, the record of agreement imple-
mentation and, in one way, speed up the process of
ASEAN integration. As pointed out by Beeson (2008: 34),
‘what is of potentially greatest importance, however, is the
commitment to effective implementation as well as com-
pliance with ASEAN agreements’.
Strengthening the ASEAN Secretariat prompts con-
cerns about how this could be funded. In general, it is
widely agreed that the Secretariat has inadequate finan-
cial and human resources to manage the association’s
growing activities and to service the needs of deeper re-
gional cooperation. Its operational budget of the ASEAN
Secretariat mainly relies on equal annual contributions
by the member states, thus reflecting the norm of equal-
ity across the organisation and stemmed from the belief
that different contributions might lead to a hierarchy of
powers. It has been pointed out that ASEAN’s system of
equal contributions is unique among international orga-
nisations that its leaders have avoided any substantial in-
crease and held back to the level of the poorest members’
capacity to pay (Severino 2009: 25). In other words, the
budget is kept low enough for the poorest state to be able
to pay without being too demanding on its resources.
However, as a lone central institution, the Secretariat is
overloaded with region-wide administrative and coordina-
tive activities as well as research, analysis, technical sup-
port and monitoring tasks (Nesadurai 2012: 16). Although
ASEAN does not make its financial statement available
for the public, Termsak Chalermpalanupap, a former Dir-
ector for Research and Special Assistant to the Secretary-
General of ASEAN, wrote that ‘in the 2007–08 financial
year, the Secretariat’s operating budget was US$ 9,050,000’
(Chalermpalanupap 2009: 122). Additionally, he also
noted during interview:
“Our budget this year (2012–2013) is only US$ 15.763
million and next year I heard there is only going to be
a 3% increase. So, it is still a very small shoestring
operation.”4
If the 2012–2013 figures are taken into consideration,
this means each member contributed US$ 1,576,300 and
represents a very small proportion of their GDPs or an-
nual national budgets. For instance, according to Bower
(2010) and Poole (2011: 6–7), the total budget of the
ASEAN Secretariat was reported to be around US$14.3
million (including funds from partner countries), which
accounted for 0.0001% of Laos’s GDP and 0.000001% of
that of Indonesia and amounts to about 0.137% of the EU’s
annual administrative budget. Calculated in terms of per
capita, ASEAN citizens spend less than $0.024 per person
per year on supporting the servicing of the organisation.5At the same time, ASEAN members, of course, con-
tribute to the association in some other ways, for ex-
ample, the offices of the National Secretariat are housed
in members’ foreign ministries. Some countries run spe-
cial projects as well as hosting and attending meetings
or events. Furthermore, ASEAN is also substantially
funded by dialogue partners or external donors, mostly
through specific projects or operations, such as capacity
building, improving infrastructure and information tech-
nology. Interestingly, Bower (2010) noted that the exter-
nal contributions are well over 20 times the Secretariat
budget. The former Secretary-General of ASEAN rein-
forced this point when he stated at interview:
“We have many cooperation projects with different
dialogue partner countries. These countries are
developed nations. They are willing to give more
resources to ASEAN. We always say ASEAN is an
OPM organisation – Other People’s Money.”6
However, relying on external resources could lead to
unavoidable external interference by the donors in the
affairs of the association. Certainly, this is not sustain-
able in the long run and not sensible if ASEAN wants to
present itself as a non-aligned and independent power
on the international political stage. Another important
matter is with regards to the lack of professional staff.
According to the figures, in 2012 ASEAN employed
roughly 300 people, including 65 managers and experts,
180 local staff and 55 persons from donor organizations
(ibid). Although these figures do not include coordinat-
ing staff who work in member countries, they are min-
uscule compared to the EU, which has about 55,000 staff
working under the umbrella of its institutions.7 Never-
theless, there are some detractors from the view that
ASEAN is underfunded, who prefer to highlight the prob-
lem of staff shortages. For instance, the former Secretary
General contradicted the previous arguments and pointed
out that the main problem of the ASEAN Secretariat is
not lacking budget, but rather the lack of well-trained bu-
reaucrats. He shared:
“It’s always being said there is not enough budget. But
in the last few years, my understanding is that the
budget is not spent… The problem is that we are
lacking in capacity. We don’t have enough ASEAN-
level bureaucrats working at the Secretariat to make
sure that all the implementation is carried out.”8
This view has been supported by Severino (2009: 25),
who wrote ‘the problem is not only the availability of funds.
It is also the difficulty of finding personnel who know
ASEAN and the requirements and limits of regional, espe-
cially economic, cooperation and integration’. Similarly, this
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resentative to ASEAN. He made the following comment:
“Do you know that every year the Secretariat also has to
return the money from the contributions of the
governments? There are some unspent budgets. (Why the
budget is not spent?) Many reasons, improved efficiency,
lack of staff… We have to differentiate between
operational budget and activity budget. Operational
budget based on the contribution of the governments and
every year we have unspent budget. For activities, I think
we need more. We don’t have enough.”9
As has been seen, despite the insufficiency of staff, the
ASEAN Secretariat is also facing difficulties in efficiency
and in attracting talented and capable people. Areetham-
sirikul (2010) pointed out that ‘the ASEAN headquarters
needs to create a regional and international working at-
mosphere and to make "working at ASEAN" a prestigious
assignment for ASEAN peoples - akin to the perception of
working at the United Nations, the World Trade Organisa-
tion, the World Bank, or the European Union.’ Thus, the
budget is not the only important concern in this respect
and I observe that as long as working for the Secretariat is
not perceived as a well-paid and challenging career as well
as cannot attract ambitious, capable and professional tal-
ent, it will be difficult for the ASEAN Secretariat to grow
into a more institutionalised organ, a powerful central ad-
ministration and/or the backbone of the association.
Finally, considering the sophisticated structure of the
EU’s institutions, this raises the question whether ASEAN
should follow suit. In other words, what should be im-
proved for ASEAN in terms of institutional development?
Although constructivism and other theories imply that in-
stitutions play a vital role in the development of regional
integration, the question is whether it is appropriate to
“copy and paste” one successful model to another context.
In general, there are quite a variety of opinions and views
on this issue. However, the majority of evidence suggests
that rather than building a more comprehensive form of
institution, ASEAN should focus on strengthening its exist-
ing institutional architecture, particularly the Secretariat
and its Secretary General. Indeed, the ASEAN Secretariat
is its only real live institutional organ, while the rest, con-
sisting of summits, meetings, dialogues, committees, sub-
committees and task forces, are periodic events with
impermanent offices (Chalermpalanupap 2009: 121). Re-
garding this matter, one scholar from RSIS asserted that:
“I would strengthen the coordination role of the
Secretariat. I would not reinvent the wheel. I would
actually look at the Secretariat and say how can we
make this more effective… for instance in terms of
implementation of the decision-making process.”10Another scholar from RSIS also had a similar view on
this issue:
“I think the priority is to build up existing institutions
rather than creating new ones. For example, Dr Surin
(the current Secretary General) needs to be given the
power and mandate to initiate policy discussion.”11
The former Secretary General also insisted that ASEAN
should focus on the existing institutions. He gave an ex-
ample of one ASEAN institution:
“The ASEAN Foundation is located in Jakarta. It is
not well-capitalized but can be developed into a more
substantial body to promote, what we call, the ASEAN
Socio-cultural Pillar - identity, belonging can be done
under the ASEAN Foundation’s osmosis.”12
He also highlighted the difference in political culture
between Southeast Asia and Europe:
“In Europe, having a European court and a European
parliament… it seems very easy to do because it has
been part of some national cultures. In Southeast Asia,
we still very jealously guard our sovereign quality.”
Taking constructivism into consideration, due to the dif-
ference in political culture and regional configurations, I
doubt whether the European style of institutionalisation
would fully work in ASEAN. Fundamentally, ASEAN has a
vast diversity among the members as the political regimes
in ASEAN span a wide spectrum ranging from electoral
democracy to full-scale authoritarianism, with no genuine
liberal democracy having emerged as yet. Thus, to my view,
the “copy and paste” idea, or importing the institutional
configuration that is based on technocracy and western
democracy, does not seem to offer a solution to the prob-
lem. However, a number of analysts believe that, in addition
to strengthening and empowering the Secretariat, ASEAN
should have some new institutional ideas in order to sup-
port the overloaded work of the ASEAN Secretariat and in-
crease the Association’s efficiency and effectiveness. For
instance, Wanandi (2006: 87) suggested that an ASEAN
Consultative Assembly consisting of members of the differ-
ent parliaments and representatives of civil society could be
a fruitful enhancement to the decision-making process,
which would make ASEAN more democratic and people-
oriented. Further, one Malaysian scholar held the view that
ASEAN also needs a research wing and a mechanism that
links its institutions to non-state sectors and NGOs. She
suggested:
“One would definitely be a research wing… (Also) I
think there is merit in creating some forms of
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tors and NGOs.”13
Nevertheless, there are a number of opinions which
appear to support a certain degree of supranationalism.
Regarding this, Hund (2002: 120) suggested that ASEAN
‘requires centrally managed policies and also more inde-
pendent and preferably supranational institutions’. In
addition, an Indonesian scholar from CSIS showed she
agreed with this point of view when she stated:
“I support (supranationalism). Not in the way that is
strong supranational. At least, it needs a body that is
for decision-making. In ASEAN, everything is always
consensus-based and in a lot of cases, especially sensi-
tive cases like territorial disputes, consensus gets us
nowhere.”14
To interpret, this does not mean ASEAN should be
heading towards a supranational form of integration as
has appeared in Europe. In the foreseeable future, ASEAN
still has to remain within the current intergovernmental
cooperative framework as long as there has been no sig-
nificant reform to its principal norms and certainly na-
tional governments would be reluctant to lose their
country’s national rights and control. More realistically, it
is rather the budget that is the first thing that needs to be
tackled. As Wanandi (2006: 87) proposed, ‘the system
now, whereby every member pays the same amount, is no
longer realistic. A new formula that is more tenable and
could increase the budget adequately should be contem-
plated’. In my opinion, the system of absolute equal con-
tribution should be reviewed in order to support the
excessive tasks of ASEAN institutions, more specifically
the ASEAN Secretariat. Despite limiting the funding to its
lowest possible level, the current system does not help
narrow development gaps between the members and does
not reflect the notion of ‘a community of caring and shar-
ing societies’,15 something that the association has been
trying to promote. However, I would advise that the mem-
bers’ contributions should perhaps be based on either the
possible gain in interest or a country’s ability to pay, that
is, the EU’s GDP-based arrangement is one option that
should be considered. For example, if each member con-
tributed 1% of its annual GDP to ASEAN, it does not neg-
lect the principle of equality, because all members are
asked for 1%, so this is perhaps just a matter of positively
rethinking the issue. This is in accord with Emmerson
(2007: 438) who opined ‘this step (the GDP-based contri-
bution) would free the Association’s budget from being
limited to ten times what the poorest or least supportive
member is willing to pay’. I am also convinced that this
new formula would help ASEAN to offset the situation
whereby there is a clear hierarchy of member’s power andinfluence. Moreover, I also suggest that ASEAN should be
provided with the means to generate its own revenue, for
example, through some kind of taxation, import duties or
licensing. This would ensure adequate resourcing and fi-
nancial stability as well as could somehow increase people’s
participation and attachment to the association because
ASEAN begins to take part in their daily lives.
Moving forward: the prospects for institutionalisation in
ASEAN
Throughout the paper, it has been apparent that having
solid, sufficient and efficient forms of institutions is es-
sential for constructing a regional community. Theoret-
ically, constructivism provides a more precise framework
to explain ASEAN institutions in that the institutional
structure of the organisation can ideationally be viewed
as a by-product as well as a representative of its norms
and principal values. For according to Stubbs (2008: 455),
‘ideas must be institutionalised in order to be converted
into concrete action and have a long lasting impact’. I
would hold that the constructivist explanation regarding
institutionalisation that surrounding environments, exter-
nal constraints and international contexts are the key
drivers, best fits with what has transpired within ASEAN.
That is, the unique configuration of features for Southeast
Asia has determined a markedly different institutional
path than taken by the EU.
Even though the case of the European Union decisively
demonstrates the crucial role of institutions and the im-
portance of supranationalism in the regional integration
process, ASEAN has not chosen this path, preferring a
non-intrusive manner and placing its faith in cooperat-
ing on the basis of intergovernmentalism. The ending of
confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia, the rise
of nationalism as a result of colonial experiences and the
gaining independence of ASEAN members, the spread
of communism, the wars that affected the region and the
influence of external powers are the main factors that
have shaped this ideational basis of the association. One
simple explanation could be that ASEAN was estab-
lished as an ad hoc resolution in order to meet regional
expectations and in response to those perceived chal-
lenges. Although the system has responded well to these
expectations, to great extent, its current regional archi-
tecture has proved insufficient to handle the growing
roles and activities as well as to remain in tune with the
regional and global trends. In sum, the theoretical expla-
nations, the empirical evidence and the different con-
texts of regional settings point to the need for a rethink
regarding ASEAN’s institutional structure so as to make
stronger and thus able to help the association meet the
challenges of increased globalisation.
On a practical level, the problems of ASEAN institu-
tions are divided into three major interrelated areas of
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Secretariat and the Secretary General, lack mandate to en-
sure compliance or have the ability to initiate policies that
can help fulfil ASEAN’s ambition. In general, the ASEAN
Secretariat, as a lone central administrative body and the
main driving force, has been only tasked with serving and
provide administrating support for the national govern-
ments without any delegation of power to it. That is, there
has not been the intention to build up regional bureaucra-
cies that could promote an independent agenda for integra-
tion beyond the scope of intergovernmental cooperation
structures (Capannelli and Tan 2012: 14). Instead, supreme
power has been wholly retained at the national government
level and ASEAN institutions remain at the margins of
policy-making. Secondly, the ASEAN Secretariat is cur-
rently experiencing financial hardship. This concern has
been expressed in much of the literature and by almost all
of the interview respondents. This is essentially due to the
system of equal member contributions, which has been
maintained as low as possible in order to accommodate the
less-developed nations, and the dependence on external
contributions. Finally, there is strong evidence that ASEAN
is understaffed, both in terms of quality and quantity.
Moreover, it cannot attract talented and capable people be-
cause they do not see “working at the ASEAN Secretariat”
as a well-paid and challenging career. These three concerns
are clearly interrelated and have become mainstream criti-
cisms of the ASEAN Secretariat that need to be resolved.
For the prospects of institutionalisation in ASEAN, a
general conclusion would be that ASEAN institutions
should be strengthened and provided with mandate, par-
ticularly in terms of policy implementation and compli-
ance, and sufficient financial and human resources to
support its administration and activities. In particular, the
current contribution system should be substantially re-
vised, because it is not realistic and applicable to the grow-
ing activities of the association. Regarding this matter, I
would propose that in order to increase financial flexibility
and stability the ASEAN Secretariat should also seek other
sources of income, rather than solely rely on member con-
tributions and external donors. This could take the form
of, for example, import duties, a percentage of tax levied
by each member country or even fines from companies
that breach ASEAN regulations. In general, I believe that
the institutional structure of ASEAN met the task, by and
large, of serving the national governments and upholding
the association’s norms and therefore there is no need to
replicate the EU’s integration experience by a complete
overhaul with the imposition of completely new institu-
tional initiatives. As most of the contributors to this re-
search have opined, ASEAN should focus on strengthening
its existing institutions by giving them more mandate, more
money and more professional staff. However, some of the
suggestions about an institutional invention are worthconsidering and can address deficiencies in the organisa-
tion, such as the establishing a research wing and a mech-
anism that can get non-state actors involved in the process
of regional governance. Furthermore, in line with Wah
(1998: 165), it is noted that long-term institutional reform
cannot be achieved without the reconsideration of the rela-
tionships with the wider institutional structure of ASEAN
that the Secretariat is nested within, particularly with
the Coordinating Council, the Ministerial Bodies, the
Committee of Permanent Representatives and the na-
tional governments.
Above all, I am convinced that ASEAN decision-makers
are aware of the institutional weaknesses in ASEAN and
want to address. This is evidenced by the introduction of
the ASEAN Charter, which was seen as an important step
forward for institutional reform as it strengthened its im-
plementation and dispute-settlement mechanisms as well
as consolidating its decision-making structure. However,
although the ASEAN Charter did empower the existing
ASEAN institutions and provided the Association with a
juridical foundation, it seems to have codified traditional
norms and practices as well as reinforcing the idea of
non-intervention (Narine 2008: 425). Therefore, in the
post-Charter era I doubt that ASEAN will become a more
effective organisation and all the institutional problems
discussed will be properly tackled any time soon. In es-
sence, it would appear to me that all the complications
arise from the fact that ASEAN integration does not in-
volve like-minded states in that the members do not share
similar political ideologies and values. Furthermore, this
political dissimilarity is safeguarded by the association’s
norms and the consensus-based decision making, which
continue to limit the role of its institutions, thus allowing
member countries to enjoy cooperation and exercise power
without fear of their sovereignty being at stake. This situ-
ation has resulted in deadlock, which has prevented the
Association from making any considerable progress and so
it ‘remains robustly intergovernmental, with little delega-
tion since it relies on “offshoots” rather than independent
agencies to implement policy’ (Capannelli and Tan 2012:
14). All in all, granting mandates and pouring resources
into the central institution will not fully resolve the prob-
lems, because it would still lack some of the most import-
ant ingredients for deeper cooperation. That is, in order to
maximum benefits from constructing a regional commu-
nity, this would need centralised policies, some degrees of
supranationalism as well as the national governments’ will-
ingness to cooperate and to delegate powers.Endnotes
1See the ASEAN Charter, Chapter IV, Article 7–15.
2The opinion given in The Jakarta Post, March 07,
2013.
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[in person] Singapore, 20 December 2012.
5In 2011, ASEAN has a population of approximately
602,658,000.
6Yong 2013. Interviewed by the author [in person]
Kuala Lumpur, 21 March 2013.
7See http://www.euractiv.com/euro-finance/european-
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8Yong 2013. Interviewed by the author [in person]
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13Nesadurai 2013. Interviewed by the author [in person]
Kuala Lumpur, 5 March 2013.
14Muhibat 2013. Interviewed by the author [in person]
Jakarta, 23 March 2013.
15See the Cebu Declaration Towards One Caring and
Sharing Community.
Competing interests
The author declares that he has no competing interests.
Received: 12 August 2014 Accepted: 17 September 2014
Published: 24 September 2014
References
Acharya A (2005) Do norms and identity matter? Community and power in
Southeast Asia's regional order. Pac Rev 18:95–118
Areethamsirikul S (2010) Can Jakarta become "the Brussels of the East" and the
capital of ASEAN., http://www.nationmultimedia.com/homeCan-Jakarta-
become-the-Brussels-of-the-East-and-th-30122277.html. Accessed 17 Jun 2014
Asian Development Bank (2010) Institutions for Regional Integration: Toward an
Asian Economic Community. Asian Development Bank, Manila
Beeson M (2008) Institutions of the Asia Pacific: ASEAN, APEC and beyond.
Routledge, New York
Best E (2005) Supranational Institutions and Regional Integration., http://www.
cepal.org/brasil/noticias/paginas/2/22962/Best%20-%20Supranational%
20Institutions.pdf. Accessed 28 Jun 2012
Bower EZ (2010) Balance & Good Health Come from a Strong Core: Is the ASEAN
Secretariat Properly Resourced?., http://csis.org/publication/balance-good-
health-come-strong-core-asean-secretariat-properly-resourced. Accessed 23
Dec 2013
Busse N (1999) Constructivism and Southeast Asian security. Pac Rev 12:39–60
Capannelli G, Tan SS (2012) Institutions for Asian Integration: Innovation and Reform.
In: ADBI Working Paper. Asian Development Bank Institute, Tokyo, p 375
Chalermpalanupap T (2009) Institutional Reform: One Charter, Three Communities,
Many Challenges. In: Emmerson DK (ed) Hard choices: security, democracy, and
regionalism in Southeast Asia. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore
Chalermpalanupap T (2012) Interviewed by the author [in person] 20 December
2012, Singapore
Chong A (2012) Interviewed by the author [in person] 21 December 2012, Singapore
Cini M (2007) European Union politics. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Collins A (2007) Forming a Security Community: Lessons from ASEAN. Int Relat
Asia Pac 7(2):203–225Desker B (2008) Is the ASEAN Charter Necessary? In: RSIS Commentaries No.77/
2008. S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore
Emmers R (2013) Interviewed by the author [in person] 22 January 2013, Singapore
Emmerson DK (2007) Challenging ASEAN: A "Topological" View. Contemp
Southeast Asia 29:424–446
Hernandez C (2007) Institution Building through an ASEAN Charter. In: Panorama:
insights into Southeast Asian and European Affairs., pp 9–52
Hund M (2002) From 'neighbourhood watch group' to community? The case of
ASEAN institutions and the pooling of sovereignty. Aust J Int Aff 56:99–122
Jetschke A (2009) Institutionalizing ASEAN: celebrating Europe through network
governance. Camb Rev Int Aff 22(3):407–426
Jetschke A, Murray P (2011) Diffusing regional integration: the EU and Southeast
Asia. West Eur Polit 35:174–191
Muhibat S (2013) Interviewed by the author [in person] 23 March 2013, Jakarta
Narine S (1998) Institutional theory and Southeast Asia: the case of ASEAN.
World Affairs 161:33–47
Narine S (2008) Forty years of ASEAN: a historical review. Pac Rev 21:411–429
Nesadurai H (2012) Enhancing the Institutional Framework for AEC
Implementation: Designing Institutions that are Effective and Politically
Feasible, Chapter prepared for the ADB-funded and ISEAS-coordinated study
on "Assessment of Impediments and Actions Required for Achieving an
ASEAN Economic Community by 2015"
Nesadurai H (2013) Interviewed by the author [in person] 5 March 2013, Kuala
Lumpur
Poole A (2011) The state versus the Secretariat: Capacity and the norm of
equality in ASEAN, Paper presented at The Australian Political Studies
Association (APSA) conference. University of Queensland, Brisbane, 29–30
September 2011
Severino R (2009) Regional Institutions in Southeast Asia: The First Movers and
their Challenge. In: Workshop on Evolution of Institutions for Regionalism in
Asia and the Pacific. Asian Development Bank, Manila, Philippines
Stubbs R (2008) The ASEAN alternative? Ideas, institutions and the challenge to
'global' governance. Pac Rev 21:451–468
Suryodiningrat M (2009) Defending the defenders - A role for the ASEAN
secretary-general., http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2009/10/29/
defending-defenders-a-role-asean-secretarygeneral.html. Accessed 24 Jun 2014
Swajaya N (2013) Interviewed by the author [in person] 22 March 2013, Jakarta
Wah CK (1998) ASEAN Institution Building. In: Leong S (ed) ASEAN towards 2020:
strategic goals and future directions. ISIS Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur
Wanandi J (2006) ASEAN future challenges and the importance of an ASEAN
Charter. ASIEN 100:85–87
Wendt A (1992) Anarchy is what states make of it - the social construction of
power-politics. Int Organ 46:391–425
Wendt A (1995) Constructing international-politics. Int Secur 20:71–81
Yong OK (2013) Interviewed by the author [in person] 21 March 2013,
Kuala Lumpur
doi:10.1186/2193-1801-3-556
Cite this article as: Rattanasevee: Towards institutionalised regionalism:
the role of institutions and prospects for institutionalisation in ASEAN.
SpringerPlus 2014 3:556.Submit your manuscript to a 
journal and beneﬁ t from:
7 Convenient online submission
7 Rigorous peer review
7 Immediate publication on acceptance
7 Open access: articles freely available online
7 High visibility within the ﬁ eld
7 Retaining the copyright to your article
    Submit your next manuscript at 7 springeropen.com
